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Case Comment
in issue and the legislation authorizing it is valid in so far as it
deals with signs, but does not extend to election signs qua election
signs displayed during the course of a federal election.
On the basis of R. v. McKay51 it is now the law in Ontario that
the provincial legislature is free to interfere with and legislate in
relation to an important segment of election advertising in federal
elections; on the other hand, provincial elections are wholly a matter
of provincial concern. In view of the complexity and detail of federal
election legislation, particularly in the Canada Elections Act,5 2 it is
all the more striking that there should be an almost total absence of
any legislation with respect to such a fundamental element of Cana-
dian elections. It is to be hoped that the problems raised by the de-
cision of the Court of Appeal will be resolved by appropriate legisla-
tion or, should the problem again arise in the courts, by the Supreme
Court of Canada. It is in one sense a favourable comment on the
tolerance in Canada in political affairs and the healthy state of Cana-
dian democratic institutions that a need has never been felt for any
such legislation, and with the exception of Dionne v. Municipal Court
of Montreal,3 where the problem arose in a slightly varied form, this
matter has not been a subject of reported litigation in Canadian
courts.
J. W. MIK
DODDS & DODDS V. MILLMAN (1964) 45 D.L.R. (2d) 472-ToRT-
EXECUTED CONTRACT FOR SALE OF REALTY-AvAILABILITY OF REMEDY
FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION BY REAL ESTATE SALESMAN.-
Early in 1963, the House of Lords in principle settled the problem of
whether or not to grant a remedy in damages for negligent misrepre-
sentation by granting such relief in the case of Hedley, Byrne & Co.
v. Heller.' In the case of Dodds v. Millman2 the Supreme Court of
British Columbia decided to follow the lead of the English courts
and make this form of relief available in the province. It is probable
that other Canadian jurisdictions will also take this position. In effect
this amounts to the creation of an entirely new tort remedy, and con-
stitutes a bold departure from the position previously taken by the
courts.
Mr. and Mrs. Dodds, having purchased a North Vancouver apart-
ment building, suffered financial loss as the result of a grossly inade-
quate "operating statement" used by the real estate salesman in
promoting the sale. They framed their action in three different ways,
51 (1963), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 401.
52 Statutes of Canada, 1960, c. 39.
53 (1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 727.
1 [1963) 2 All E.R. 575.
2 (1964), 45 D.L.R. (2d) 472.
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suing the vendor for recission of the contract, and in deceit, and
claiming damages against the real estate agent for negligent mis-
representation in the operating statement. This operating statement
contained a projection of future revenues and expenses in the opera-
tion of the apartment building, but omitted to mention repairs,
decorating, managerial fees and janitorial expenses. The plaintiffs, in
suing the real estate agent for negligent misrepresentation, relied on
a duty of care arising from the business relationship of the parties in
terms of the principle of Hedley, Byrne & Co. v. Heller.
The claim for recission of the contract failed, since the court
found as a fact that there was an executed contract for the sale of
land. Once such contracts are executed, any right to recission for
damages caused by negligent misrepresentations is lost.3 The court
further found that the plaintiffs had affirmed the contract. This find-
ing was not necessary to the decision, but would have cut off the right
to recission had the contract involved a sale of something other than
land. In contracts for the sale of land, execution alone is sufficient
to terminate a right to rescind; in other contracts both execution and
affirmation are required.
The claim for deceit or fraudulent misrepresentation failed since
the court found that the element of fraud was not present.4 The court
found that the real estate agent was "guilty of gross carelessness",
but that "he may have been misled by his informers".5
The court then found that the vendor was not liable for damages
for negligent misrepresentation because of an exculpatory clause con-
tained in the interim receipt:
It is understood and agreed that there are no other representations,
warranties, promises or agreements other than those contained In the
agreement.6
The court did not, however, permit the realty company and its
salesman to shelter under this exculpatory clause in the sales con-
tract, holding that they were not privy to the contract and could not,
therefore, escape liability by virtue of its provisions.7 The court found
that the real estate salesman and his employer had been guilty of
negligent misrepresentation, and ordered them to pay $8,500.00 dam-
ages to the plaintiff.
In order to appreciate the importance and consequences of the
B.C. Supreme Court's decision, the principles upon which its conclu-
sion was based must be considered. The plaintiff's success in estab-
lishing a claim in tort on the one hand, and the unavailability of a
remedy in contract on the other, indicate the differing policies of the
law. The law of contract does not allow a remedy for negligent mis-
representation, fearing too wide and unforseeable an extension of
liability. Consequently, the scope of contractual remedies is circum-
3 Seddon v. N.E. Salt Co. Ltd., [19051 1 Ch. 326.
4 Wilde v. Gibson (1848), 1 H.L.C. 605 at 632.




scribed by well defined ideas like privity. The law of tort, on the
other hand, has remained more flexible, displaying a willingness to
extend remedies where it could be shown that a duty of care existed.
These tendencies collided in Dodds v. Millman. The consequence was
a widening of liability in tort, and an indication that the doctrine of
privity of contract is now being seriously challenged by the law of
negligence.
In Hedley, Byrne & Co. v. Heller it was decided that categories
existed wherein the court could impose liability in damages for
negligent misstatement. This liability would arise in special relation-
ships where a client relied upon a professional or business person's
judgment. These special relationships created a duty of care upon the
representor toward the person he knows will rely upon his statements
unless the representor disclaims liability.8 This view resulted after a
long struggle to broaden the basis of tort liability against ideas of
privity originating in the case of Winterbottom v. Wright.9 In 1914
Lord Haldane's view that special relationships, in addition to fraud
or dishonesty, might give rise to a duty of care was an early sign of
change.10 A major change came with Donoghlue v. Stevenson' which
sidestepped the doctrine of privity, extending liability to negligence
causing physical loss. However, no remedy was granted for negligence
causing economic or financial harm. The last important decision in
which damages were denied for negligent misstatement appeared in
Candler v. Crane Christmas & Co.12 in 1951, Denning L.J. strongly
dissenting. Denning L.J. followed the older authority of Cann v.
Wilson13 in which Chitty L.J. had awarded damages against a prop-
erty valuator for negligent misrepresentation despite a lack of privity.
The issue was how far to extend liability for careless statements.
Denning L.J.'s views were fully applied 14 and liability was extended
by Hedley, Byrne 4& Co. v. Heller. This completed the work of Dono-
ghue v. Stevenson by virtually eliminating the concept of privity from
the law of tort.
In Dodds v. Millman a duty of care could arise if Lord Pearce's
qualifications were met:
the representation must normally, I think, concern a business or pro-
fessional transaction whose nature makes clear the gravity of the inquiry
and the importance and influence attached to the answer.1 5
7 The court here followed the reasoning in Midland Silicones Ltd. v.
Scruttons Ltd., [196111 Q.B. 106 (C.A.).8 Lord Denning in Candler v. Crane Christmas & Co., [1951] 1 All E.R.
426; 2 K.B. at 179-181.
9 (1842), 10 M. & W. 109; 152 E.R. 402.10 Nocton v. Lord Ashburton, [1914] A.C. 932 at 948 and 955.
11 [1932] A.C. 562.
12 Supra, footnote 8.
13 (1888), 39 Ch. D. 39.
14 The Gold Spirits Have Conquered: Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller, 3 Os-
goode Hall L.J. 89.Is Supra, footnote 1 at 617.
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The real estate salesman and buyer are surely in such a rela-
tionship, as is the vendor, for the duty is not limited by privity' 6 or
the nature of the loss sustained. 17 The House of Lords in Hedley
Byrne recognized that the duty of care can arise in a wide variety
of situations. 18 Dodds v. Millman in applying the Hedley, Byrne & Co.
v. Heller decision apparently adopted this wide view of liability.
Once it is established that a duty of care may arise, the plaintiffs
must next prove that a representation was made to them upon which
they relied. In order to establish liability, it is necessary to prove
that the representor intended that his representation be relied upon.
Here it must be shown that in the business situation the buyer relied
upon the misrepresentation of the salesman in the ordinary course of
a business transaction, that is, it was warranted or justified reliance.19
If the intended reliance is not clear to the defendant, this may not
matter as long as the plaintiffs were justified in relying upon the
representation. 20 At the outset MacLean J. was careful to clarify the
nature of the misrepresentation. In regard to the operating statement
he said:
It was accepted by them [the plaintiffs] not as a representation of an
existing fact, but I am satisfied that,it was accepted by them as a state-
ment of the existing honest opinion of the person who made it to them,
namely, the real estate agent.21
This evidently contradicts statements of law by both Anson and
Fleming which maintain that only a representation of existing or
past fact and not mere opinion is necessary in order to bring an action
and to find a defendant liable.22 On the other hand a statement of
American law enunciated by Prosser says that opinions in regard to
realty transactions form a special case and may be treated as state-
ments of fact provided that the opinion comes from one with special
knowledge (for example, an experienced real estate agent).23 This is
a possible rationale. However it may be that a justifiable reliance
alone is decisive and that the nature of the representations perhaps
no longer matters.24
In regard to reliance Denning L.J. had said:
[the duty of care] extends, I think, only to those transactions for
which the accountants knew their accounts were required .... This dis-
tinction, that the duty only extends to the very transaction in mind at
the time, is implicit in the decided cases.25
16 Supra, footnote 1, Lord Reid at 580, 581; Lord Morris at 588.
17 Supra, footnote 1, Lord Hodson at 598.
18 Supra, footnote 1 at 509, 523, 528; See also Anson, Principles of the
English Law of Contract, 1964, 22nd ed., p. 227 ff.
19 Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, 1964, 3rd ed., p. 731 ff.
20 Id. at 737.8.
21 Supra, footnote 2 at 474.
22 Fleming, The Law of Torts, 1961, 2nd ed., pp. 597-8.
23 Supra, footnote 19 at 737-8.
24 Id. at 743.
25 Supra, footnote 8 at 435.
[VOL. 3:377
Case Comment
The fact of reliance was essential and MacLean J. proceeded
directly to find it:
In his inexperience, Mr. Dodds questioned none of the statements... and
I am satisfied that the plaintiff relied upon the agent's statements as
honest expressions of the agent's bona fide opinion as to the future oper-
ating costs of the building.26
Next it was vital to show the court that the representation relied
upon was in fact a misrepresentation or a negligent statement. In
deciding this point it is necessary to employ a proper standard of
care. Where business or professional people are concerned the stan-
dard is that of normal business with resort to the custom of trade, if
necessary, to see whether the defendant's behaviour and judgment
met the standard of the whole profession.27 The onus of proving a
failure to meet this standard falls upon the plaintiff.28 Evidence was
adduced by experienced people who dealt in real estate. This was the
proper procedure to indicate the inaccuracy of facts in the operating
statement29 and to prove that a misrepresentation had occurred. Posi-
tive negligence was also found since the salesman's omissions of cost
items were such as "any agent of even average experience would know
should be included".30
It is perhaps impossible to foretell the impact that the Dodds v.
Millman decision will have in Canada. As yet no pertinent decisions
have appeared. Other than an obiter dictum by Whittaker J. in Boyd
v. Aekley, 31 this is the first Canadian case to follow Hedley, Byrne &
Co. v. Heller. In December 1963 the Supreme Court of Canada per-
mitted an action in deceit to be based on the "concealment" of ma-
terial facts affecting the value of a house sold.32 This case was in
many ways similar to Dodds v. Millman, the main difference being
the way in which the actions were framed. The significant difference
lies, probably, in the willingness of the Supreme Court to construe
gross negligence as equivalent to fraud. Since Dodds v. Milman it is
likely that other Canadian jurisdictions will follow the lead taken by
the B.C. Supreme Court in allowing damages for negligent misrepre-
sentation. Anson has suggested that fraud now need only be pleaded
in executed realty contracts,33 probably in deference to the rule in
Seddon v. N.E. Salt Co. Ltd.. But since Dodds v. Millman it may be
more logical to suggest that fraud now need never be pleaded in
Canada.34
26 Supra, footnote 2 at 474.
27 Supra, footnote 14 at 103.
28 Ibid.
29 Supra, footnote 2 at 475-7. The inaccuracy of the operating statement
was shown. Expenses were in fact twice the total given and maximum rentals
had been inflated. Most important, a real estate appraiser valued the property
at $35,000, or $8,500 less than the plaintiffs paid. The difference or "out of
pocket" loss was taken as the measure of damages.
30 Ibid.
31 (1962), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 77 at 80.
32 Hepting v. Schaaf, (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 168 at 170.
33 Anson, op. cit. pp. 227 and 218.
34 Prosser, op. cit. p. 727 suggests that innocent misrepresentation must
be sued for in deceit but at p. 721 he admits that suing in negligence or in
deceit is probably only a matter of form.
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If Dodds v. Millman is generally accepted, Canada will be in
roughly the same position as England with regard to negligent mis-
representation. This is a progressive step, easing the burden of proof
for the plaintiff where fraudulent intent cannot be established, yet
negligence is clear.
The U.S. authorities seem to be the best gauge of how far the
limits of liability for negligent misrepresentation can be extended.
The generally accepted American view seems to be that stated by
Cardozo C.J. in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche35 where liability is limited
to specific persons known to the defendant when he made his mis-
representation. This seems wider than "special relationships". A wider
liability to third parties has been justified on the grounds that pro-
fessional and business people can adjust fees in order to insure them-
selves against liability for negligent misstatement. 36 U.S. courts have
allowed recovery of damages in special circumstances even where no
reliance existed, the action being based solely on the relation between
the parties.37 The American Restatement contains the widest general
statement of liability. There the liability of public officials is limited
only to the class to which information is made available and to any
transactions meant to be affected by the information. 38
In England the far reaching nature of the Hedley, Byrne d Co.
v. Heller principle has been criticized; it is said that liability for
negligent misstatements can be generalized as simply damages for
"reasonable" reliance which caused loss. This displaces the distinc-
tion between contractual and tort remedies since liability is not based
upon foreseeability. The remedy can apply to all phases of con-
tracting: 39
If so, then there must be a tort action whenever in the preliminaries one
party either generally by unreasonable behaviour or specifically by mak-
ing a statement which he ought to have known was false causes loss to
the other whether that loss takes place owing to the failure validly to
contract or by means of the eventuating contract itself.4 0
Furthermore, negligent interference with or promotion of con-
tractual relations could become a tort if a contract remained unful-
filled. 41 These possibilities may never be fully realized but they pre-
sage developments as advanced as those in the U.S. and, perhaps,
more significant and varied in their possible effects.
G. GROSS
35 225 N.Y. 170; 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
36 Recent Cases: Negligent Misrepresentation, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 355 at
356 (1948).
37 Ibid.
38 Recent Cases: Negligent Misrepresentation, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 773 at
775 (1964).
39 Weir, J. A., Liability For Syntax, (1963), Camb. L.J., 216 at 21819.
40 Id. at 220.
41 Ibid.
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